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International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS): pros and cons for investors 
Ray Ball* 
Abstract-Accounting in shaped by economic and political forces. It follows that increased worldwide integration 
of both markets and politics (driven by reductions in communications and information processing costs) makes in- 
creased integration of financial reporting standards and practice almost inevitable. But most market and political 
forces will remain local for the foreseeable future, so it is unclear how much convergence in actualfinancial re- 
porting practice will (or should) occur. Furthermore, there is little settled theory or evidence on which to build an 
assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of uniform accounting rules within a country. let alone interna- 
tionally. The pros and cons of IFRS therefore are somewhat conjectural, the unbridled enthusiasm of allegedly al- 
truistic proponents notwithstanding. On the ‘pro’ side of the ledger. l conclude that extraordinary success has been 
achieved in developing a comprehensive set of ‘high quality’ IFRS standards, in persuading almost 100 countries 
to adopt them, and in obtaining convergence in standards with important non-adopters (notably. the US). On the 
‘con’ side, I envisage problems with the current fascination of the IASB (and the FASB) with ‘fair value account- 
ing‘. A deeper concern is that there inevitably will be substantial differences among countries in implementation of 
IFRS. which now risk being concealed by a veneer of uniformity. The notion that uniform standards alone will pro- 
duce uniform financial reporting seems naive. In  addition. I express several longer run concerns. Time will tell. 
1. Introduction and outline 
It is a distinct pleasure to deliver the 2005 PD 
Leake Lecture, and I sincerely thank the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) for inviting me to do so. PD Leake was 
an early contributor to a then fledgling but now 
mature accounting literature. His work on good- 
will (Leake, 1921a,b) stands apart from its con- 
temporaries, so it is an honour to celebrate the 
contributions of such a pioneer. My introduction to 
Leake’s work came from a review article 
(Carsberg, 1966) that I read almost 40 years ago. 
Ironically, the review was published in a journal I 
now co-edit (Journal of Accounting Research), 
and was written by a man who later became a pio- 
neer in what now are known as International 
Financial Reporting Standards (the subject of this 
lecture), and with whom I once co-taught a course 
on International Accounting (here in London, at 
London Business School). It truly is a small world 
in many ways - which goes a long way to explain- 
ing the current interest in international standards. 
*The author is Sidney Davidson Professor of Accounting at 
the University of Chicago. His paper is based on the PD Leake 
Lecture delivered on 8 September 2005 at the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, which can be 
accessed at http://www.icaew.co.uWindex.cfm?route= I 12609, 
I t  draws extensively on the framework in Ball (1995) and ben- 
efited from comments by Steve Zeff. Financial support from 
the PD Leake Trust and the Graduate School of Business at 
the University of Chicago is gratefully acknowledged. 
Correspondence should be addressed to Professor Ball at the 
Graduate School of Business. University of Chicago. 5807 S .  
Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago. IL 60637. Tel. +00 1 (773) 834 
594 I : E-mail: ray.ball@gsb.uchicaEo.edu 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) are forefront on the immediate agenda be- 
cause, starting in 2005, listed companies in 
European Union countries are required to report 
consolidated financial statements prepared accord- 
ing to IFRS. At the time of speaking, companies 
are preparing for the release of their first full-year 
IFRS-compliant financial statements. Investors 
have seen interim reports based on IFRS, but have 
not yet experienced the full gamut of year-end ad- 
justments that IFRS might trigger. Consequently, 
the advantages and disadvantages of IFRS for in- 
vestors (the specific topic of this lecture) are a 
matter of current conjecture. I shall try to shed 
some light on the topic but, as the saying goes, 
only time will tell. 
I . I .  Outline 
I begin with a description of IFRS and their his- 
tory, and warn that there is little settled theory or 
evidence on which to build an assessment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of uniform account- 
ing rules within a country, let alone international- 
ly. The pros and cons of IFRS therefore are 
somewhat conjectural, the unbridled enthusiasm of 
allegedly altruistic proponents notwithstanding. I 
then outline my broad framework for addressing 
the issues, which is economic and political. 
On the ‘pro’ side of the ledger, I conclude that 
extraordinary success has been achieved in devel- 
oping a comprehensive set of ‘high quality’ stan- 
dards and in persuading almost 100 countries to 
adopt them. On the ‘con’ side, a deep concern is 
that the differences in financial reporting quality 
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6 
that are inevitable among countries have been 
pushed down to the level of implementation, and 
now will be concealed by a veneer of uniformity. 
The notion that uniform standards alone will pro- 
duce uniform financial reporting seems nayve, if 
only because it ignores deep-rooted political and 
economic factors that influence the incentives of 
financial statement preparers and that inevitably 
shape actual financial reporting practice. I envis- 
age problems with the current fascination of the 
IASB (and the FASB) for ‘fair value accounting’. 
In addition, I express several longer run concerns. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSlNESS RESEARCH 
uniformity in accounting standards, at least to my 
knowledge? 
There thus is good reason (and, I will argue 
below, some evidence) to be sceptical of the strong 
claims that its advocates make for a single global 
set of accounting standards. So while this means 
Europe’s adoption of IFRS is a leap of faith, it also 
means it is a Brave New World for commentators 
on IFRS, myself included. I therefore caution that 
the following views are informed more by basic 
tenets of economics (and some limited evidence) 
than by a robust, directly-relevant body of re- 
search. 
2. Background 
2.1. What are IFRS? 
IFRS are accounting rules (‘standards’) issued 
by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB), an independent organisation based in 
London, UK. They purport to be a set of rules that 
ideally would apply equally to financial reporting 
by public companies worldwide. Between 1973 
and 2000, international standards were issued by 
the IASB’s predecessor organisation, the 
International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC), a body established in 1973 by the profes- 
sional accountancy bodies in Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom and Ireland, and the United 
States. During that period, the IASC’s rules were 
described as ‘International Accounting Standards’ 
(IAS). Since April 2001, this rule-making function 
has been taken over by a newly-reconstituted 
IASB.’ The IASB describes its rules under the new 
label ‘International Financial Reporting 
Standards’ (IFRS), though it continues to recog- 
nise (accept as legitimate) the prior rules (IAS) is- 
sued by the old standard-setter (IASC).2 The IASB 
is better-funded, better-staffed and more independ- 
ent than its predecessor, the IASC. Nevertheless, 
there has been substantial continuity across time in 
its viewpoint and in its accounting standards.’ 
2.2. Brave New World 
I need to start by confessing substantial igno- 
rance on the desirability of mandating uniform ac- 
counting, and to caution that as a consequence 
much of what I have to say is speculative. There 
simply is not much hard evidence or resolved the- 
ory to help. 
This was an unsettled issue when I was an ac- 
counting student, over 40 years ago. A successful 
push for mandating uniformity at a national level 
occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. 
National uniformity was a central theme of the 
first Congress of Accountants in 1904.“ A century 
later, there is an analogous push for mandating 
uniformity at an international level, but in the 
meantime no substantial, settled body of evidence 
or literature has emerged in favour - or against - 
2.3. Some thoughts on the role of mandatory uni- 
form accounting standards 
IFRS boosters typically take the case for manda- 
tory (i.e., required by state enactment) uniform 
(i.e., required of all public companies) accounting 
standards as self evident. In this regard, they are 
not alone: in my experience, most accounting text- 
books, most accounting teachers and much of the 
accounting literature are in the same boat. But the 
case for imposing accounting uniformity by fiat is 
far from clear. Some background analysis of the 
economic role of mandatory uniform accounting 
standards, one hopes, will assist the reader in sort- 
ing through claims as to the pros and cons of the 
European Union mandating of IFRS. 
Voluntary standards. The fundamental economic 
function of accounting standards is to provide 
‘agreement about how important commercial 
transactions are to be implemented’ (Ball, 
1995: 19). For example, if lenders agree to lend to 
a company under the condition that its debt fi- 
nancing will not exceed 60% of tangible assets, it 
helps to have agreement on how to count the com- 
pany’s tangible assets as well as its debts. Are non- 
cancellable leases debt? Unfunded health care 
commitments to employees? Expected future tax 
payments due to transactions that generate book 
income now? Similarly, if a company agrees to 
provide audited profit figures to its shareholders, it 
is helpful to be in agreement as to what constitutes 
a profit. Specifying the accounting methods to be 
’ The International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) Foundation was incorporated in 2001 as a not-for- 
profit corporation in the State of Delaware, US. The IASC 
Foundation is the legal parent of the International Accounting 
Standards Board. 
For convenience, I will refer to all standards recognised by 
the IASB as IFRS. ’ The IASB account of its history can be found at 
http://www.iasb.org/about/history.asp. 
“The proceedings of the Congress can be found on the web- 
site of the 10th World Congress of Accounting Historians: 
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/worldcongress/high- 
1ights.htm. See also Staub (1938). 
The available literature includes Dye (1985). Farrell and 
Saloner (1985). Dye and Verrecchia (1995) and Pownall and 
Schipper (1999). 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
followed constitutes an agreement as to how to im- 
plement important financial and legal concepts 
such as leverage (gearing) and earnings (profit). 
Accounting methods thus are an integral compo- 
nent of the contracting between firms and other 
parties, including lenders, shareholders, managers, 
suppliers and customers. 
Failure to specify accounting methods ex ante 
has the potential to create uncertainty in the pay- 
offs to both contracting parties. For example, fail- 
ure to agree in advance whether unfunded health 
care commitments to employees are to be counted 
as debt leaves both the borrower and the lender un- 
sure as to how much debt the borrower can have 
without violating a leverage covenant. Similarly, 
failure to specify in advance the rules for counting 
profits creates uncertainty for investors when they 
receive a profit report, and raises the cost of capi- 
tal to the firm. But accounting standards are costly 
to develop and specify in advance, so they cannot 
be a complete solution. Economic efficiency im- 
plies a trade-off, without a complete set of stan- 
dards that fully determine financial reporting 
practice in all future states of the world (i.e., ex- 
actly and for all contingencies). Some future states 
of the world are extremely costly to anticipate and 
explicitly contract for! Standards thus have their 
limits. 
The alternative to fully specifying ex ante the ac- 
counting standards to meet every future state of the 
world requires what I call ‘functional completion’ 
(Ball, 1989). Independent institutions then are in- 
serted between the firm and its financial statement 
users, their function being to decide ex post on the 
accounting standards that would most likely have 
been specified ex ante if the actually realised state 
had been anticipated and provided for. Prominent 
examples of independent institutions that play this 
role in contracting include law courts, arbitrators, 
actuaries, valuers and auditors. When deciding 
what would most likely have been specified ex 
ante if the realised state had been anticipated and 
provided for, some information is contained in 
what was anticipated and provided for. This infor- 
mation will include provisions that were specified 
for similar states to that which occurred. It also 
will include abstract general provisions that were 
intended for all states. In financial reporting, this is 
the issue involved in so-called ‘principles-based’ 
accounting: the balance between general and spe- 
cific provision for future states of the world. 
Uniform voluntary standards. I am aware of at 
least three major advantages of uniform (here in- 
terpreted as applying equally to all public compa- 
nies) standards that would cause them to emerge 
voluntarily (i.e., without state fiat). The first ad- 
vantage - scale economies - underlies all forms of 
uniform contracting: uniform rules need only be 
invented once. They are a type of ‘public good’, in 
7 
that the marginal cost of an additional user adopt- 
ing them is zero. The second advantage of uniform 
standards is the protection they give auditors 
against managers playing an ‘opinion shopping’ 
game. If all auditors are required to enforce the 
same rules, managers cannot threaten to shop for 
an auditor who will give an unqualified opinion on 
a more favourable rule. The third advantage is 
eliminating informational externalities arising 
from lack of comparability. If firms and/or coun- 
tries use different accounting techniques - even if 
unambiguously disclosed to all users - they can 
impose costs on others (in the language of eco- 
nomics, create negative externalities) due to lack 
of comparability. To the extent that firms inter- 
nalise these effects, it will be advantageous for 
them to use the same standards as others. 
These advantages imply that some degree of uni- 
formity in accounting standards could be expected 
to arise in a market (i.e., non-fiat) setting. This is 
what happened historically: as is the case for most 
professions, uniform accounting standards initially 
arose in a market setting, before governments be- 
came involved. In the UK, the ICAEW functioned 
as a largely market-based standard-setter until re- 
cently. In the US, the American Association of 
Public Accountants - the precursor to today’s 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
- was formed in 1887 as a professional body with- 
out state fiat. In 1939, the profession accepted gov- 
ernment licensure and bowed to pressure from the 
SEC to establish a Committee on Accounting 
Procedure. The CAP issued 51 Accounting 
Research Bulletins before being replaced in 1959 
by the AICPA’s Accounting Principles Board 
(APB), which in turn was replaced in 1973 by the 
current FASB. While the trend has been to in- 
creased regulation (fiat) over time, the origin of 
uniform accounting standards lies in a voluntary, 
market ~ e t t i n g . ~  
There also are at least three important reasons to 
expect somewhat less-than-uniform accounting 
methods to occur in a voluntary setting. First, it is 
not clear that uniform financial reporting qualit4, 
requires uniform accounting rules (‘one size fits 
all’). Uniformity in the eyes of the user could re- 
quire accounting rules that vary across firms, 
across locations and across time. Firms differ on 
myriad dimensions such as strategy, investment 
policy, financing policy, industry, technology, cap- 
ital intensity, growth, size, political scrutiny, and 
geographical location. The types of transactions 
they enter into differ substantially. Countries differ 
In the extreme case of  presently unimaginable future 
states, i t  is infinitely costly (i.e., impossible, even with infinite 
resources) to explicitly contract for optimal state-contingent 
payoffs, including those affected by financial reporting. ’ Watts and Zirnmerman (1986) note the market origins of 
financial reporting and auditing more generally. 
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8 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
standards is increased cross-border integration of 
markets and politics (Ball, 1995). Driving this in- 
tegration is an extraordinary reduction in the cost 
of international communication and transacting. 
The cumulative effect of innovations affecting al- 
most all dimensions of information costs - for ex- 
ample in computing, software, satellite and 
fibre-optic information transmission, the internet, 
television, transportation, education - is a revolu- 
tionary plunge in the cost of being informed about 
and becoming an actor in the markets and politics 
of other countries. In my youth, only a small elite 
possessed substantial amounts of current informa- 
tion about international markets and politics. 
Today, orders of magnitude more information is 
freely available to all on the internet. Informed 
cross-border transacting in product markets and 
factor markets (including capital and labour mar- 
kets) has grown rapidly as a consequence. 
Similarly, voters and politicians are much better 
informed about the actions of foreign politicians, 
and their consequences, than just a generation ago. 
We have witnessed a revolutionary internationali- 
sation of both markets and politics, and inevitably 
this creates a demand for international conver- 
gence in financial reporting. 
How far this will go is another matter. Despite 
the undoubted integration that has occurred, no- 
tably in the capital and product markets, most mar- 
ket and political forces are local, and will remain 
so for the foreseeable future. Consequently, it is 
unclear how much convergence in actualfinancial 
reporting practice will (or should) occur. I return 
to this theme below. 
in how they run their capital, labour and product 
markets, and in the extent and nature of govern- 
mental and political involvement in them. It has 
never been convincingly demonstrated that there 
exists a unique optimum set of rules for all. 
Second, as observed above it is costly to develop 
a fully detailed set of accounting standards to cover 
every feasible contingency, so standards are not the 
only way of solving accounting method choices. 
Some type of ‘functional completion’ is required. 
For example, under ‘principles based’ accounting, 
general principles rather than detailed standards are 
developed in advance and then adapted to specific 
situations with the approval of independent audi- 
tors. It therefore is not optimal for all accounting 
choices to be made according to uniform standards. 
The above-mentioned reasons to expect less than 
uniform accounting methods in a voluntary setting 
share the property that uniformity is not the opti- 
mal way to go. The third reason, that firms and/or 
countries using different accounting methods 
might not fully internalise the total costs imposed 
on others due to lack of comparability, does not 
have that property. It therefore provides a rationale 
for mandating uniformity, to which I now turn. 
Mandatory uniform standards are a possible so- 
lution to the problem of informational externali- 
ties. If their use of different accounting methods 
imposes costs on others that firms and/or countries 
do not take into account in their decisions, then it 
is feasible that the state can improve aggregate 
welfare by imposing uniformity. Whether the 
state-imposed solution can be expected to be opti- 
mal is another matter. Political factors tend to dis- 
tort state action, a theme I shall return to. 
At a more basic level, it is not clear that imper- 
fect comparability in financial reporting practice is 
a substantial problem requiring state action. Is ac- 
counting information a special economic good? 
Hotel accommodation, for example, differs enor- 
mously in quality. Different hotels and hotel chains 
differ in the standards they set and the rules they 
apply. Their rooms are not comparable in size or 
decor, their elevators do not operate at comparable 
speed, their staffs are not equally helpful, they 
have different cancellation policies, etc. There is 
no direct comparability of one hotel room with an- 
other, even with the assistance of the myriad rating 
systems in the industry, but consumers make 
choices without the dire consequences frequently 
alleged to occur from differences in accounting 
rules. All things considered, the case for imposing 
accounting uniformity by fiat is far from clear. 
2.4. Why is international convergence in 
accounting standards occurring now? 
Accounting is shaped by economics and politics 
(Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986), so the 
source of international convergence in accounting 
3. Scoring IASB against its stated 
objectives 
This section evaluates the progress the IASB has 
made toward achieving its stated objectives, which 
include:s 
1.  ‘develop ... high quality, understandable and en- 
forceable global accounting standards ... that 
require high quality, transparent and compara- 
ble information ... to help participants in the 
world’s capital markets and other users ... .’ 
2. ‘promote the use and rigorous application of 
those standards.’ 
3.  ‘bring about convergence ... .’ 
tives in turn. 
I discuss progress toward each of these objec- 
3.1. Development 
Here the IASB has done extraordinarily well.” It 
Source: http://www .iasb .org/about/const itut ion .asp 
Deloitte & Touche LLP provide a comprehensive review 
of IFRS at www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pubs.htm. 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
has developed a nearly complete set of standards 
that, if followed, would require companies to 
report ‘high quality, transparent and comparable 
information’. 
I interpret financial reporting ‘quality’ in very 
general terms, as satisfying the demand for finan- 
cial reporting. That is, high quality financial state- 
ments provide useful information to a variety of 
users, including investors. This requires: 
accurate depiction of economic reality (for ex- 
ample: accurate allowance for bad debts; not 
ignoring an imperfect hedge); 
low capacity for managerial manipulation; 
timeliness (all economic value added gets 
recorded eventually; the question is how 
promptly); and 
asymmetric timeliness (a form of conservatism): 
timelier incorporation of bad news, relative to 
good news, in the financial statements. 
Accounting standard-setters historically have 
viewed the determinants of ‘quality’ as ‘relevance’ 
and ‘reliability,’ but I do not find these concepts 
particularly useful. For example, IASB and FASB 
recently have been placing less emphasis on relia- 
bility. In my view, this arises from a failure to dis- 
tinguish reliability that is inherent in the 
accounting for a particular type of transaction (the 
extent to which a reported number is subject to un- 
avoidable estimation error) from reliability arising 
from capacity for managerial manipulation (the 
extent to which a reported number is subject to 
self-interested manipulation by management). 
Compared to the legalistic, politically and tax- 
influenced standards that historically have typified 
Continental Europe, IFRS are designed to: 
reflect economic substance more than legal form; 
reflect economic gains and losses in a more 
timely fashion (in some respects, even more so 
than US GAAP); 
make earnings more informative; 
provide more useful balance sheets; and 
curtail the historical Continental European dis- 
cretion afforded managers to manipulate provi- 
sions, create hidden reserves, ‘smooth’ earnings 
and hide economic losses from public view. 
The only qualification I would make to my 
favourable assessment of IFRS qua standards 
lo The regulation was adopted on 19 July 2002 by the 
European Parliament and Council (EC) 1606/2002. After ex- 
tensive political lobbying and debate, the EC ‘carved out’ two 
sections of IAS 39, while at the same time announcing this ac- 
tion as exceptional and temporary, and reiterating its support 
for IFRS. 
9 
therefore is the extent to which they are imbued by 
a ‘mark to market’ philosophy, an issue to which I 
return below. 
3.2. Promotion 
success. Indicators of this success include: 
Here the IASB also has experienced remarkable 
Almost 100 countries now require or allow 
IFRS. A complete list, provided by Deloitte and 
Touche LLP (2006), is provided in Figure 1. 
All listed companies in EU member countries 
are required to report consolidated financial 
statements complying with IFRS, effective in 
2005.‘O 
Many other countries are replacing their na- 
tional standards with IFRS for some or all do- 
mestic companies. 
Other countries have adopted a policy of re- 
viewing IFRS and then adopting them either 
verbatim or with minor modification as their 
national standards. 
The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the international or- 
ganisation of national securities regulators, has 
recommended that its members permit foreign 
issuers to use IFRS for cross-border securities 
offerings and listings. 
The IASB has been tireless in promoting IFRS at 
a political level, and its efforts have paid off hand- 
somely in terms ranging from endorsement to 
mandatory adoption. Whether political action 
translates into actual implementation is another 
matter, discussed below. 
3.3. Convergence 
Convergence refers to the process of narrowing 
differences between IFRS and the accounting stan- 
dards of countries that retain their own standards. 
Depending on local political and economic factors, 
these countries could require financial reporting to 
comply with their own standards without formally 
recognising IFRS, they could explicitly prohibit 
reporting under IFRS, they could permit all com- 
panies to report under either IFRS or domestic 
standards, or they could require domestic compa- 
nies to comply with domestic standards and permit 
only cross-listed foreign companies to comply 
with either. Convergence can offer advantages, 
whatever the reason for retaining domestic stan- 
dards. It is a modified version of adoption. 
Several countries that have not adopted IFRS at 
this point have established convergence projects 
that most likely will lead to their acceptance of 
IFRS, in one form or another, in the not too distant 
future. Most notably: 
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10 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Figure 1 
Use of IFRSs around the world 
Use of IFRSs for domestic reporting by listed companies as of February 2006. 
Source: Deloitte, Touche, Tohmatsu, IFRS in Your Pocket 2006, fifth edition, April, 
at: http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/pocket2006.pdf. 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
Since October 2002, the IASB and the FASB 
have been working systematically toward con- 
vergence of IFRS and US GAAP. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
the US national market regulator, has set a tar- 
get date no later than 2009 for it accepting fi- 
nancial statements of foreign registrants that 
comply with IFRS. 
The IASB recently commenced a similar, 
though seemingly less urgent and ambitious, 
convergence project with Japan. 
I repeat the caveat that converge de fact0 is less 
certain than convergence de jure: convergence in 
actual financial reporting practice is a different 
thing than convergence in financial reporting stan- 
dards. I return to this point in Section 6 below. 
I I  
adjustments analysts historically have made in 
order to make companies' financials more 
comparable internationally. IFRS adoption 
therefore could reduce the cost to investors of 
processing financial information. The gain 
would be greatest for institutions that create 
large, standardised-format financial databases. 
4. A bonus is that reducing the cost of processing 
financial information most likely increases the 
efficiency with which the stock market incor- 
porates it in prices. Most investors can be ex- 
pected to gain from increased market 
efficiency. 
5 .  Reducing international differences in account- 
ing standards assists to some degree in remov- 
ing barriers to cross-border acquisitions and 
divestitures, which in theory will reward in- 
vestors with increased takeover premiums.'* 
In general, IFRS offer increased comparability 
and hence reduced information costs and informa- 
tion risk to investors (provided the standards are 
implemented consistently, a point I return to 
below) 
4. Advantages of IFRS for investors 
4.1. Direct IFRS advantages fo r  investors 
Widespread international adoption of IFRS of- 
fers equity investors a variety of potential advan- 
tages. These include: 
IFRS promise more accurate, comprehensive 
and timely financial statement information, rel- 
ative to the national standards they replace for 
public financial reporting in most of the coun- 
tries adopting them, Continental Europe in- 
cluded. To the extent that financial statement 
information is not known from other sources, 
this should lead to more-informed valuation in 
the equity markets, and hence lower risk to in- 
vestors. 
Small investors are less likely than investment 
professionals to be able to anticipate financial 
statement information from other sources. 
Improving financial reporting quality allows 
them to compete better with professionals, and 
hence reduces the risk they are trading with a 
better-informed professional (known as 'ad- 
verse selection').'' 
By eliminating many international differences 
in accounting standards, and standardising re- 
porting formats, IFRS eliminate many of the 
4.2. Indirect IFRS advantages for  investors 
IFRS offer several additional, indirect advan- 
tages to investors. Because higher information 
quality should reduce both the risk to all investors 
from owning shares (see 1 .  above) and the risk to 
less-informed investors due to adverse selection 
(see 2. above), in theory it should lead to a reduc- 
tion in firms' costs of equity capital.I3 This would 
increase share prices, and would make new invest- 
ments by firms more attractive, other things equal. 
Indirect advantages to investors arise from im- 
proving the usefulness of financial statement in- 
formation in contracting between firms and a 
variety of parties, notably lenders and managers 
(Watts, 1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). 
Increased transparency causes managers to act 
more in the interests of shareholders. In particular, 
timelier loss recognition in the financial state- 
ments increases the incentives of managers to at- 
tend to existing loss-making investments and 
strategies more quickly, and to undertake fewer 
new investments with negative NPVs, such as 
'pet' proiects and 'trophy' acquisitions (Ball 2001 ; 
ii See GIosten and Milgrom ( 1985), Diamond and Ball hd"Shivakumar,2005). Ball (2004j concludes 
this was the primary motive behind the 1993 deci- Verrecchia (1991) and Leuz and Verrecchia (2000). 
See Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988). sion of Daimler-Benz (now DaimlerChrvsler) AG 
- ,  
1.1 The magnitude of cost of capital benefits from disclosure 
is an unsettled research question, both theoretically and em- 
pirically. Empirical studies encounter the problem of control- 
ling for correlated omitted variables, notably companies' 
to list on the N~~ york'Stock Exchange and report 
financial statements complying with US GAAP: 
due to intensifying product market competition 
growth opportunities. Theory research is sensitive to model 
tion but not the magnitude of any effects. See Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991). Botosan (1997), Leuz and Verrecchia 
(2000). Botosan and Plumlee (2002). Hail (2002). Daske 
(2006) and Easton (2006). 
and hence lower profit margins in its core automo- 
subsidise loss-making activities. ~~~h~~~ et al. 
(2006) evidence that firms in countries with 
timelier financial-statement recognition of losses 
assumptions. and frequently can offer insights into the direc- bile businesses, Daimler no longer could afford to 
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12 
are less likely to undertake negative-NPV invest- 
ments. The increased transparency and loss recog- 
nition timeliness promised by IFRS therefore 
could increase the efficiency of contracting be- 
tween firms and their managers, reduce agency 
costs between managers and shareholders, and en- 
hance corporate g0~ernance. l~ The potential gain 
to investors arises from managers acting more in 
their (i.e., investors’) interests. 
The increased transparency promised by IFRS 
also could cause a similar increase in the efficien- 
cy of contracting between firms and lenders. In 
particular, timelier loss recognition in the financial 
statements triggers debt covenants violations more 
quickly after firms experience economic losses 
that decrease the value of outstanding debt (Ball 
2001,2004; Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Ball et al., 
2006). Timelier loss recognition involves timelier 
revision of the book values of assets and liabilities, 
as well as earnings and stockholders’ equity, caus- 
ing timelier triggering of covenants based on fi- 
nancial statement variables. In other words, the 
increased transparency and loss recognition timeli- 
ness promised by IFRS could increase the effi- 
ciency of contracting in debt markets, with 
potential gains to equity investors in terms of re- 
duced cost of debt capital. 
An ambiguous area for investors will be the ef- 
fect of IFRS on their ability to forecast earnings. 
One school of thought is that better accounting 
standards make reported earnings less noisy and 
more accurate, hence more ‘value relevant’. Other 
things equal (for example, ignoring enforcement 
and implementation issues for the moment) this 
would make earnings easier to forecast and would 
improve average analyst forecast accuracy.15 The 
other school of thought reaches precisely the op- 
posite conclusion. This reasoning is along the lines 
that managers in low-quality reporting regimes are 
able to ‘smooth’ reported earnings to meet a vari- 
ety of objectives, such as reducing the volatility of 
their own compensation, reducing the volatility of 
payouts to other stakeholders (notably, employee 
bonuses and dividends), reducing corporate taxes, 
and avoiding recognition of losses . I 6  In contrast, 
earnings in high-quality regimes are more inform- 
ative, more volatile, and more difficult to predict. 
This argument is bolstered in the case of IFRS 
by their emphasis on ‘fair value accounting’. as 
outlined in the following section. Fair value ac- 
counting rules aim to incorporate more-timely in- 
formation about economic gains and losses on 
securities, derivatives and other transactions into 
the financial statements, and to incorporate more- 
timely information about contemporary economic 
losses (‘impairments’) on long term tangible and 
intangible assets. IFRS promise to make earnings 
more informative and therefore, paradoxically, 
more volatile and more difficult to forecast. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
In sum, there are a variety of indirect ways in 
which IFRS offer benefits to investors. Over the 
long term, the indirect advantages of IFRS to in- 
vestors could well exceed the direct advantages. 
5. Fair value accounting 
A major feature of IFRS qua standards is the extent 
to which they are imbued with fair value account- 
ing [a.k.a. ‘mark to market’ accounting]. Notably: 
IAS 16 provides a fair value option for proper- 
ty, plant and equipment; 
IAS 36 requires asset impairments (and impair- 
ment reversals) to fair value; 
IAS 38 requires intangible asset impairments to 
fair value; 
IAS 38 provides for intangibles to be revalued 
to market price, if available; 
IAS 39 requires fair value for financial instru- 
ments other than loans and receivables that are 
not held for trading, securities held to maturity; 
and qualifying hedges (which must be near- 
perfect to qualify);” 
IAS 40 provides a fair value option for invest- 
ment property; 
IFRS 2 requires share-based payments (stock, 
options, etc.) to be accounted at fair value; and 
IFRS 3 provides for minority interest to be 
recorded at fair value. 
This list most likely will be expanded over time. 
Both IASB and FASB have signalled their intent to 
do so. 
I have distinctly mixed views on fair value ac- 
counting. The fundamental case in favour of fair 
value accounting seems obvious to most econo- 
mists: fair value incorporates more information 
into the financial statements. Fair values contain 
more information than historical costs whenever 
there exist either: 
1.  Observable market prices that managers cannot 
materially influence due to less than perfect 
market liquidity; or 
l 4  These ‘numerator’ effects of higher quality financial re- 
porting (i.e., increasing the cash flows arising from managers’ 
actions) in my view are likely to have a considerably larger 
influence on firms’ values than any ‘denominator’ effects 
(i.e., reducing the cost of capital). See Ball (2001: 140-141). 
However. it is difficult to disentangle the two effects in prac- 
tice. 
l5  See Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001 ). Hope (2003) and Lang, 
Lins and Miller (2003). 
I h  See Ball. Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball. Robin and 
wu (2003). 
17Available-for-sale securities are to be shown at Fair Value 
in the Balance Sheet only. 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
2. Independently observable, accurate estimates 
Incorporating more information in the financial 
statements by definition makes them more inform- 
ative, with potential advantages to investors, and 
other things equal it makes them more useful for 
purposes of contracting with lenders, managers 
and other parties.18 
Over recent decades, the markets for many com- 
modities and financial instruments, including de- 
rivatives, have become substantially deeper and 
more liquid. Some of these markets did not even 
exist 30 years ago. There has been enormous con- 
current growth in electronic databases containing 
transactions prices for commodities and securities, 
and for a variety of assets such as real estate for 
which comparable sales can be used in estimating 
fair values. In addition, a variety of methods for re- 
liably estimating fair values for untraded assets 
have become generally acceptable. These include 
the present value (discounted cash flow) method, 
the first application of which in formal accounting 
standards was in lease accounting (SFAS No. 13 in 
1976), and a variety of valuation methods adapted 
from the original Black-Scholes (1973) model. In 
view of these developments, it stands to reason 
that accountants have been replacing more and 
more historical costs with fair values, obtained 
both from liquid market prices and from model- 
based estimates thereof. 
The question is whether IASB has pushed (and 
intends to push) fair value accounting too far. 
There are many potential problems with fair value 
in practice, including:Iy 
of liquid market prices. 
Market liquidity is a potentially important issue 
in practice. Spreads can be large enough to 
cause substantial uncertainty about fair value 
and hence introduce noise in the financial state- 
ments. 
In illiquid markets, trading by managers can in- 
fluence traded as well as quoted prices, and 
hence allows them to manipulate fair value es- 
timates. 
Worse, companies tend to have positively cor- 
related positions in commodities and financial 
instruments, and cannot all cash out simultane- 
ously at the bid price, let alone at the ask. Fair 
value accounting has not yet been tested by a 
major financial crisis, when lenders in particu- 
lar could discover that ‘fair value’ means ‘fair 
weather value’. 
When liquid market prices are not available, 
fair value accounting becomes ‘mark to model’ 
accounting. That is, firms report estimates of 
market prices, not actual arm’s length market 
prices. This introduces ‘model noise,’ due to 
imperfect pricing models and imperfect esti- 
a 
13 
mates of model parameters. 
If liquid market prices are available, fair value 
accounting reduces opportunities for self-inter- 
ested managers to influence the financial state- 
ments by exercising their discretion over 
realising gains and losses through the timing of 
asset sales. However, fair value accounting in- 
creases opportunities for manipulation when 
‘mark to model’ accounting is employed to 
simulate market prices, because managers can 
influence both the choice of models and the pa- 
rameter estimates. 
It is important to stress that volatility per se is 
not the concern here. Volatility is an advantage in 
financial reporting, whenever it reflects timely in- 
corporation of new information in earnings, and 
hence onto balance sheets (in contrast with 
‘smoothing,’ which reduces volatility). However, 
volatility becomes a disadvantage to investors and 
other users whenever it reflects estimation noise 
or, worse, managerial manipulation. 
The fair value accounting rules in IFRS place 
considerable faith in the ‘conceptual framework’ 
that IASB and FASB are jointly developing 
(IASB, 2001). This framework: 
is imbued with a highly controversial ‘value 
relevance’ philosophy; 
emphasises ‘relevance’ relative to ‘reliability;’ 
assumes the sole purpose of financial reporting 
is direct ‘decision usefulness;’ 
downplays the indirect ‘stewardship’ role of 
accounting; and 
could yet cause IASB and FASB some grief. 
IASB and FASB seem determined to push ahead 
with it nevertheless. FASB staff member L. Todd 
Johnson (2005) concludes: 
‘The Board has required greater use of fair value 
measurements in financial statements because it 
perceives that information as more relevant to in- 
vestors and creditors than historical cost informa- 
tion. Such measures better reflect the present 
financial state of reporting entities and better facil- 
itate assessing their past performance and future 
I” Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006) conclude from a cross- 
country analysis that providing new information to equity in- 
vestors is not the dominant economic function of financial 
reporting (investors can be informed about gains and losses in 
a timely fashion via disclosure, without financial statement 
recognition). Conversely, the dominant function of  timely loss 
recognition is to facilitate contracting (the study focused on 
debt markets). 
I’ In addition, gains and losses in fair value are transitory in 
nature and hence are unlike recurring business income. For ex- 
ample, they normally will sell at lower valuation multiples. To 
avoid misleading investors, fair value gains and losses need to 
be clearly labelled as such. 
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prospects. In that regard, the Board does not accept 
the view that reliability should outweigh relevance 
for financial statement measures.’ 
Noisy information on gains and losses is more in- 
formative than none, so even the least reliable ‘mark 
to model’ estimates certainly incorporate more in- 
formation. But this is not a sufficient basis for justi- 
fying fair value accounting, for at least four reasons: 
1. 
2. 
3 
‘Value relevance’ (i.e., informing users) is by 
no means the sole criterion for financial report- 
ing. One also has to consider the role of finan- 
cial reporting in contexts where noise matters, 
including debt and compensation contracts 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001). Noise in any financial informa- 
tion that affects contractual outcomes (e.g., 
lenders’ rights when leverage ratio or interest 
coverage covenants are violated; managers’ 
bonuses based on reported earnings) increases 
the risk faced by both the firm and contracting 
parties. Other things equal, it thus is a source of 
contracting inefficiency. Providing more infor- 
mation thus can be worse than providing less, 
if it is accompanied by more noise. ‘Mark to 
model’ fair value accounting can add volatility 
to the financial statements in the form of both 
information (a ‘good’) and noise arising from 
inherent estimation error and managerial ma- 
nipulation (a ‘bad’). 
It is important to distinguish ‘recognition’ (in- 
corporating information in the audited financial 
statements, notably by including estimated 
gains and losses in earnings and book value) 
from ‘disclosure’ (informing investors, for ex- 
ample by audited footnote disclosure or provi- 
sion of unaudited information, without 
incorporation in earnings or on balance sheets). 
Noisy fair value information does not necessar- 
ily have to be recognised to be useful to equity 
investors?0 The case for increased deployment 
of fair value accounting in the audited financial 
statements is not based on any substantial body 
of evidence - at least of which I am aware - that 
gain and loss information is not available from 
sources outside the financial statements, and 
that value is added in the economy by auditing 
it, let alone by incorporating it in earnings. 
Financial reporting conveys an important eco- 
nomic role by accurately and independently 
counting actual outcomes, and hence confirm- 
ing prior information about expected out- 
comes. In particular, if managers believe actual 
outcomes are more likely to be reported accu- 
rately and independently, they are less likely to 
disclose misleading information about their ex- 
pectations. It is possible that, as a financial re- 
porting regime strays far from reporting 
outcomes by incorporating more information 
4. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
about expectations, the reliability of the avail- 
able information about expectations begins to 
fall. A feasible outcome is that the amount of 
information contained in the financial state- 
ments rises, and at the same time the total 
amount of information falls?’ 
Accounting standards and - what is more im- 
portant - accounting practice have long since 
been imbued with one of the two sides of ‘fair 
value’ accounting. That is, timely loss recogni- 
tion, in which expected future cash losses are 
charged against current earnings and book 
value of equity, is a long-standing property of 
financial reporting. The other side of ‘fair 
value,’ timely gain recognition, is not as preva- 
lent in practice (Basu, 1997). Loss recognition 
timeliness is particularly evident in common- 
law countries such as Australia, Canada, UK 
and US (Ball et al., 2000). It affects financial 
reporting practice in many ways, including the 
pervasive ‘lower of cost or market’ rule (for ex- 
ample, accruing expected decreases in the fu- 
ture realisable value of inventory against 
current earnings, but not expected increases), 
accruing loss contingency provisions (but set- 
ting a higher standard for verification of gain 
contingencies), and long term asset impairment 
charges (but not upward revaluations). It sim- 
ply is incorrect to view the prevailing financial 
reporting model as ‘historical cost accounting’. 
Financial reporting, particularly in common- 
law countries, is a mixed process involving 
both historical costs and (especially contingent 
on losses) fair values. 
In sum, I have mixed views about the extent to 
which IFRS are becoming imbued with the current 
IASB/FASB fascination with ‘fair value account- 
ing’. On the one hand, this philosophy promises to 
incorporate more information in the financial 
statements than hitherto. On the other, it does not 
necessarily make investors better off and its use- 
fulness in other contexts has not been clearly 
demonstrated. Worse, it could make investors and 
other users worse off, for a variety of reasons. The 
jury is still out on this issue. 
Barth. Clinch and Shibano (2003) provide some theoreti- 
cal support for the proposition that recognition matters per se. 
though the result flows directly from the model‘s assumptions. 
Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006) argue that equity investors are 
relatively indifferent between receiving a given amount of in- 
formation (i.e., controlling for the amount of noise) via dis- 
closure and via recognition in the financial statements. 
Conversely, they argue that the demand for recognition versus 
disclosure arises primarily from the use of financial statements 
in debt markets. 
? I  See Ball (2001: 133-138) for elaboration. 
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6. Effect on investors of uneven 
implementation 
I believe there are overwhelming political and eco- 
nomic reasons to expect IFRS enforcement to be 
uneven around the world, including within 
Europe. Substantial international differences in fi- 
nancial reporting practice and financial reporting 
quality are inevitable, international standards or no 
international standards. This conclusion is based 
on the premise that - despite increased globalisa- 
tion - most political and economic influences on 
financial reporting practice remain local. It is rein- 
forced by a brief review of the comparatively 
toothless body of international enforcement agen- 
cies currently in place. The conclusion also is sup- 
ported by a fledgling academic literature on the 
relative roles of accounting standards and the in- 
centives of financial-statement preparers in deter- 
mining actual financial reporting practice. 
One concern that arises from widespread IFRS 
adoption is that investors will be mislead into be- 
lieving that there is more uniformity in practice 
than actually is the case and that, even to sophisti- 
cated investors, international differences in report- 
ing quality now will be hidden under the rug of 
seemingly uniform standards. In addition, uneven 
implementation curtails the ability of uniform 
standards to reduce information costs and informa- 
tion risk, described above as an advantage to in- 
vestors of IFRS. Uneven implementation could 
increase information processing costs to transna- 
tional investors - by burying accounting inconsis- 
tencies at a deeper and less transparent level than 
differences in standards. In my view, IFRS imple- 
mentation has not received sufficient attention, 
perhaps because it lies away from public sight, 
‘under the rug’. 
6.1. Markets and politics remain primarily local, 
not global 
The fundamental reason for being sceptical 
about uniformity of implementation in practice is 
that the incentives of preparers (managers) and en- 
forcers (auditors, courts, regulators, boards, block 
15 
shareholders, politicians, analysts, rating agencies. 
the press) remain primarily local. 
All accounting accruals (versus simply counting 
cash) involve judgments about future cash flows. 
Consequently, there is much leeway in implement- 
ing accounting rules. Powerful local economic and 
political forces therefore determine how managers, 
auditors, courts regulators and other parties influ- 
ence the implementation of rules. These forces 
have exerted a substantial influence on financial 
reporting practice historically, and are unlikely 
to suddenly cease doing so, IFRS or no IFRS. 
Achieving uniformity in accounting standards 
seems easy in comparison with achieving unifor- 
mity in actual reporting behaviour. The latter 
would require radical change in the underlying 
economic and political forces that determine actu- 
al behaviour. 
Sir David Tweedie, IASB chairman, premises 
the case for international uniformity in accounting 
standards on global integration of markets:22 
‘As the world’s capital markets integrate, the 
logic of a single set of accounting standards is ev- 
ident. A single set of international standards will 
enhance comparability of financial information 
and should make the allocation of capital across 
borders more efficient. The development and ac- 
ceptance of international standards should also re- 
duce compliance costs for corporations and 
improve consistency in audit quality.’ 
But this logic works both ways. One can change 
the underlying premise to make a case against uni- 
formity. Because capital markets are not perfectly 
integrated (debt markets in particular), and be- 
cause more generally economic and political inte- 
gration are both far from being complete, the logic 
of national diflerences should be equally evident. 
While increased internationalisation of markets 
and politics can be expected to reduce some of the 
diversity in accounting practice across nations, na- 
tions continue to display clear and substantial do- 
mestic facets in both their politics and how their 
markets are structured, so increased internationali- 
sation cannot be expected to eliminate diversity in 
practice. 
I have heard an analogy made between IFRS and 
the metric system of uniform weights and meas- 
ures.23 The analogy is far from exact, but instruc- 
tive nevertheless. There is an old saying: ‘The 
weight of the butcher’s thumb on the scale is heav- 
ier in ... [other country XI .’ Despite uniform meas- 
urement rules, the butcher’s discretion in 
implementing them is limited only by the practised 
eye of the customer, by concern for reputation, and 
by the monitoring of state and private inspection 
systems. The lesson from this saying is that moni- 
toring mechanisms operate differently across na- 
tions. There is considerably more discretion in 
implementing financial reporting rules than in 
?? Considering the amount of time the IASB has exerted in 
lobbying governments (the EU included) on IFRS adoption, 
there is some irony in Sir David focusing on international in- 
tegration of markets, without mentioning integration of politi- 
cal forces. The strongly adverse initial reaction to the 
publication of Watts (1977) and Watts and Zimmerman 
( 1978). introducing the topic of political influences on finan- 
cial reporting practice, suggests this is a sensitive issue. 
23 The metric system was first proposed in 1791. was adopt- 
ed by the French revolutionary assembly in 1795, and was 
substantially refined and widely adopted during the second 
half of the nineteenth century (primarily in code law coun- 
tries). France then ceded control of the system to an interna- 
tional body, and in I875 the leading industrialised countries 
(including the US. but not the UK) created the International 
Bureau of Weights and Measures to administer it. 
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16 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
the implication being that the primary driving 
forces behind the majority of actual accounting 
practices seem likely to remain domestic in nature 
for the foreseeable future. 
The most visible effect of local political and eco- 
nomic factors on IFRS lies at the level of the na- 
tional standard adoption decisi0n.2~ This already 
has occurred to a minor degree, in the EU ‘carve 
out’ from IAS 39 in the application of fair value 
accounting to interest rate hedges. The European 
version of IAS 39 emerged in response to consid- 
erable political pressure from the government of 
France, which responded to pressure from domes- 
tic banks concerned about balance sheet volatili- 
ty.25 Episodes like this are bound to occur in the 
future, whenever reports prepared under IFRS pro- 
duce outcomes that adversely affect local interests. 
Another level at which local political and eco- 
nomic factors are likely to visibly influence IFRS 
adoption stems from the latitude IFRS give to 
firms to choose among alternative accounting 
methods.26 Local factors make it unlikely that this 
discretion will be exercised uniformly across 
countries, and across firms within countries. 
Nevertheless, in my view the most likely effect 
of local politics and local market realities on IFRS 
will be much less visible than was the case with 
the prolonged political debate on IAS 39. I believe 
the primary effect of local political and market fac- 
tors will lie under the surface, at the level of im- 
plementation, which is bound to be substantially 
inconsistent across nations. 
Does anyone seriously believe that implementa- 
tion will be of equal standard in all the nearly 100 
countries, listed in Figure I ,  that have announced 
adoption of IFRS in one way or another? The list 
of adopters ranges from countries with developed 
accounting and auditing professions and devel- 
oped capital markets (such as Australia) to coun- 
tries without a similarly developed institutional 
background (such as Armenia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Kenya, Kuwait, Nepal, Tobago 
and Ukraine). 
Even within the EU, will implementation of 
IFRS be at an equal standard in all countries? The 
list includes Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, 
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and 
weighing meat, and consequently this is offset by 
considerably more complex, frequent and effective 
financial reporting monitoring mechanisms. But 
here too the monitoring mechanisms operate dif- 
ferently across nations. 
Before getting too carried away with globalisa- 
tion, it is worth remembering that in fact most 
markets and most politics are local, not global. The 
late Tip O’Neill, long-time speaker of the US 
House of Representatives, famously stated 
(O’Neill, 1993): ‘All politics is local.’ Much the 
same could be said about markets. Important di- 
mensions in which the world still looks consider- 
ably more local than global include: 
Extent and nature of government involvement 
in the economy; 
Politics of government involvement in finan- 
cial reporting practices (e .g., political influence 
of managers, corporations, labour unions, 
banks); 
Legal systems (e.g., common versus code law; 
shareholder litigation rules); 
Securities regulation and regulatory bodies; 
Depth of financial markets; 
Financial market structure (e.g., closeness of re- 
lationship between banks and client companies); 
The roles of the press, financial analysts and 
rating agencies; 
Size of the corporate sector; 
Structure of corporate governance (e.g., rela- 
tive roles of labour, management and capital); 
Extent of private versus public ownership of 
corporations; 
Extent of family-controlled businesses; 
Extent of corporate membership in related- 
company groups (e.g., Japanese keiretsu or 
Korean chaebol); 
Extent of financial intermediation; 
The role of small shareholders vs. institutions 
and corporate insiders; 
The use of financial statement information, in- 
cluding earnings, in management compensa- 
tion; and 
The status, independence, training and com- 
pensation of auditors. 
The above list is far from complete, but it gives 
some sense of the extent to which financial report- 
ing occurs in a local, not global, context. Despite 
increased globalisation, the clear majority of eco- 
nomic and political activity remains intranational, 
?‘ Zeff (2006) surveys political influences on standard adop- 
tions in the US, Canada, the UK and Sweden, and also in re- 
lation to IFRS. 
?s In my view, governments will not in practice cede the de- 
cision to impair banks’ balance sheets to accountants. In the 
event of a financial crisis, there is strong political pressure to 
not mark banks’ balance sheets to market, in order to avoid 
bank closures resulting from violating prudential ratios, as 
witnessed in Japan over the last decade. 
26 See Watts (1977) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986). 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
the UK. It is well known that uniform EU econom- 
ic rules in general are not implemented evenly, with 
some countries being notorious  standout^.^' What 
makes financial reporting rules different? 
Accounting accruals generally require at least 
some element of subjective judgment and hence 
can be influenced by the incentives of managers 
and auditors. Consider the case of IAS 36 and IAS 
38, which require periodic review of long term 
tangible and intangible assets for possible impair- 
ment to fair value. Do we seriously believe that 
managers and auditors will comb through firms’ 
asset portfolios to discover economically impaired 
assets with the same degree of diligence and ruth- 
lessness in all the countries that adopt IFRS? Will 
auditors, regulators, courts, boards, analysts, rating 
agencies, the press and other monitors of corporate 
financial reporting provide the same degree of 
oversight in all IFRS-adopting countries? In the 
event of a severe economic downturn creating 
widespread economic impairment of companies’ 
assets, will the political and regulatory sectors of 
all countries be equally likely to turn a blind eye? 
Will they be equally sympathetic to companies 
failing to record economic impairment on their ac- 
counting balance sheets, in order to avoid loan de- 
fault or bankruptcy (as did Japanese banks for an 
extended period)? Will local political and econom- 
ic factors cease to exert the influence on actual 
financial reporting practice that they have in the 
past? Or will convergence among nations in adopt- 
ed accounting standards lead to an offsetting di- 
vergence in the extent to which they are 
implemented? 
The drift toward fair value accounting in IFRS 
will only accentuate the extent to which JFRS im- 
plementation depends on manager and auditor 
judgment, and hence is subject to local political 
and economic influence. Furthermore, the clear 
majority of IFRS adopting countries cannot be said 
to possess deep securities, derivatives and curren- 
cy markets. Implementation of the IFRS fair value 
accounting standards in many countries will en- 
counter problems with illiquidity, wide spreads 
and subjectivity in ‘mark to model’ estimates of 
fair value. Furthermore, in many countries the 
available information needed to implement the 
asset impairment standards is meagre and not read- 
ily observable to auditors and other monitors. To 
make matters worse, the countries in which there 
will be greater room to exercise judgment under 
fair value accounting, due to lower-liquidity mar- 
17 
kets and poorer information about asset impair- 
ment, are precisely the countries with weaker local 
enforcement institutions (audit profession, legal 
protection, regulation, and so on). Judgment is a 
generic property of accounting standard imple- 
mentation, but worldwide reliance on judgment 
has been widely expanded under IFRS by the drift 
to fair value accounting and by the adoption of fair 
value standards in countries with illiquid markets. 
It is worth bearing in mind that from the outset 
the IASC, the precursor to the IASB, has been 
strongly supported by the ‘G4+1’ common law 
countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK 
and US) which have comparatively deep markets 
and comparatively developed shareholders’ rights, 
auditing professions, and other monitoring sys- 
tems. Its philosophy has been tilted toward a com- 
mon-law view of financial reporting (a topic 
discussed further below). This view forms the 
foundation for accounting standards that require 
timely recognition of losses, in particular the asset 
impairment standards IAS 36 and IAS 38. 
Historically, common-law financial reporting has 
exhibited a substantially greater propensity to 
recognise economic losses in a timely fashion than 
financial reporting in Continental Europe and Asia 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball et al., 2003). 
Implementation of IAS 36 and IAS 38 requires 
subjective assessments of future cash flows, some- 
times decades into the future, and thus is subject to 
a large degree of discretion. It remains to be seen 
if managers, auditors, regulators and other moni- 
tors outside of the common-law countries will be 
persuaded by IFRS adoption that it is in their in- 
terests to radically change their behaviour. 
In sum, even a cursory review of the political 
and economic diversity among IFRS-adopting na- 
tions, and of their past and present financial re- 
porting practices, makes the notion that uniform 
standards alone will produce uniform financial re- 
porting seems naive. This conclusion is strength- 
ened by the following review of the weak 
international IFRS enforcement mechanisms that 
are in place, and by a review of the relevant litera- 
ture on the relative roles of accounting standards 
and the reporting incentives of financial statement 
preparers (i .e . , managers and auditors). 
6.2. IFRS enforcement mechanisms 
Under its constitution, the IASB is a standard- 
setter and does not have an enforcement mecha- 
nism for its standards: it can cajole countries and 
companies to adopt IFRS in name, but it cannot re- 
quire their enforcement in practice. It cannot pe- 
nalise individual companies or countries that adopt 
its standards, but in which financial reporting prac- 
tice is of low quality because managers, auditors 
and local regulators fail to fully implement the 
standards. Nor has it shown any interest in disal- 
?’ For example, the Financial Times (July 19,2005) reports 
that ‘Italy has the worst record of all European Union member 
states when it comes to implementing the laws that underpin 
the EU’s internal market, according to data released by the 
European Commission yesterday. ... The worst performers 
apart from Italy are Luxembourg, Greece. the Czech Republic 
and Portugal.’ 
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18 
lowing or even dissuading low-quality companies 
or countries from using its ‘brand name’. 
Individual countries remain primarily regulators of 
their own financial markets, EU member countries 
included. That exposes IFRS to the risk of adop- 
tion in name only. 
Worldwide regulatory bodies generally are re- 
garded as toothless watchdogs, despite recent at- 
tempts to strengthen them. The ‘alphabet soup’ of 
international regulators now includes: 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
differ among countries). The relevance of this lit- 
erature to IFRS implemenation is the implication 
that, to the extent financial reporting practice is en- 
dogenous, an exogenously-developed set of ac- 
counting standards is unlikely to materially change 
firms’ actual reporting behaviour. Complete endo- 
geneity would imply that change in financial re- 
porting would occur only if there was change in 
the real economic and political factors that deter- 
mine it - for example, it would imply that uniform 
financial reporting would only occur under per- 
fectly integrated world markets and political sys- 
tems, uniform standards notwithstanding. Partial 
endogeneity would imply that adopting uniform 
international standards would have some, but lim- 
ited, success in overcoming national differences in 
the real economic and political factors that deter- 
mine actual practice, and hence in reducing differ- 
ences in financial reporting practice. 
Research on the economic and political factors 
that influence financial reporting practice interna- 
tionally includes Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000); 
Pope and Walker (1999); Ball, Robin and Wu 
(2000,2003); Ali and Hwang (2000); Leuz (2003); 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003); Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith (2004, 2006); Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006); Ball, Robin and Sadka (2006); 
and Leuz and Oberholzer (2006). One contribution 
of this research is to document substantial differ- 
ences among countries in reporting behavior that 
are endogenously determined by local economic 
and political factors. This evidence implies that 
adopting uniform IFRS would not fully overcome 
national differences in financial reporting practice. 
A related contribution is more direct evidence that 
exogenously imposed standards do not substantial- 
ly influence financial reporting quality. 
Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) investigate dif- 
ferences in financial reporting quality between 
common-law and code-law countries .29 Common 
law takes its name from the process whereby laws 
originate: it its pure form, common law arises from 
what is commonly accepted to be appropriate prac- 
tice. Common law originated in England and 
spread to its former colonies (US, Canada, 
International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), a committee of the 
International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC). IAASB issues and promotes uniform 
auditing practices worldwide, but lacks effec- 
tive enforcement powers. 
International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), an umbrella organisa- 
tion of national regulators. IOSCO develops 
and promotes securities regulation standards 
and their enforcement. It encourages member 
countries to adopt IFRS , but does not police 
their enforcement. 
Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB), estab- 
lished in February 2005 by IOSCO, the Base1 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), the World Bank, and the 
Financial Stability Forum. PIOB will oversee 
IFAC’s standard-setting activities in audit per- 
formance, independence, ethics, quality con- 
trol, assurance and education. In relation to 
enforcement, it will oversee IFAC’s Member 
Body Compliance Program. 
European regulatory bodies include: 
Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR). CESR promulgates high-level IFRS 
enforcement principles. . EU Directive on Statutory Audit of Annual 
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts. The EU 
Directive mandates EU-wide auditing stan- 
dards. 
Whether these bodies will substantially har- 
monise actual reporting behaviour in not yet clear. 
Even if all IFRS-adopting nations agreed to fully 
cede their sovereignty over regulation of financial 
reporting to these transnational bodies, which 
seems highly doubtful, domestic political and eco- 
nomic forces most likely would cause them to ab- 
rogate that agreement whenever it suited them .zx 
6.3. Standards versus incentives 
An emerging literature investigates the extent to 
which differences in actual reporting behaviour are 
endogenous (i.e., determined by real economic and 
political factors that are local in nature and that 
~ 
A recent parallel is France’s refusal to enforce EU 
takeover rules, which has led to considerable watering down 
of the rules after a decade of negotiation. In the meantime, 
France announced it would block rumoured takeovers of 
Groupe Danone SA by the US company PepsiCo Inc., and of 
Suez SA by Italy’s Enel SPA. As a result of France’s political 
position, EU rules have been loosened so that member states 
i i o u  h;r\.s \\.ids latitude to set rheir orr’n standards in relation 
to takeover defences. The notion of an integrated European 
market for corporate control thereby has been considerably di- 
luted. The lesson is that global rules will prevail so long as 
they do not run foul of important local interests. Why would 
financial reporting rules be any different? 
?’ Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) was replicated and ex- 
tended (the publication dates are misleading) by Pope and 
Walker ( 1999). 
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Australia, New Zealand). It tends to be more mar- 
ket-oriented, supports a proportionately larger list- 
ed corporate sector, is more litigious, tends to 
presume that investors are outsiders ‘at arm’s- 
length’ from the company, and hence is more like- 
ly to presume that investors rely on timely public 
disclosure and financial reporting. Financial re- 
porting practice (and rules) emphasises timely 
recognition of losses in the financial statements. 
Earnings are more volatile, more informative, and 
more closely-followed by investors and analysts. 
Unlike code law, common law in its purest form 
makes standard-setting a private-sector responsi- 
bility. 
Code law also takes its name from the process 
whereby laws, including financial reporting rules, 
are created: they are ‘coded’ in the public sector. 
Politically powerful stakeholder groups necessari- 
ly are represented in both codifying and imple- 
menting rules. Code law originated in Continental 
Europe and spread to the former colonies of 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain. Code-law countries generally are less mar- 
ket-oriented, have proportionately larger govern- 
ment and unlisted private-company sectors, are 
less litigious, and are more likely to operate an ‘in- 
sider access’ model with less emphasis on public 
financial reporting and disclosure. There is less 
emphasis on timely recognition of losses in the 
public financial statements, and earnings have 
lower volatility and lower informativeness. 
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) study four East Asian 
countries. They argue that the companies in these 
countries are more likely to be members of related 
corporate groups, including those under family 
control, in which a version of the ‘insider access’ 
model operates and hence there is less emphasis 
than under common law on public financial re- 
porting and disclosure. While the specific politi- 
cally powerful stakeholder groups are different 
than in typical code-law countries (notably, organ- 
ised labour typically has less political clout in Asia 
than in code law countries), governments play a 
similar role in the economy. 
In practice, the distinction between the code-law, 
common-law and Asian groupings is blurred (for 
example, where does one place Hong Kong over 
time?). Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) and Ball, 
Robin and Wu (2003) use the categories as an im- 
perfect proxy for the extent and type of political 
involvement in the economy, and hence of the ex- 
tent to which political (versus market) factors in- 
fluence finacial reporting practice. Countries with 
highly politicised economies are more likely to 
politicise financial reporting practice, but they also 
tend to gravitate toward an ‘insider access’ (versus 
public disclosure) model and to grant politically 
powerful stakeholder groups an important role. 
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) eschew country- 
19 
type classifications and employ the more-detailed 
legal-system variables reported in La Porta et al. 
(1997, 1998), though in a different context Ball, 
Robin and Sadka (2006) report evidence that coun- 
try-type variables work better, consistent with the 
view that detailed institutional variables are en- 
dogenously determined by more primitive political 
and economic factors. Which approach better ex- 
plains international differences in financial report- 
ing practice is an interesting and not fully resolved 
issue. Nevertheless, all studies indicate that differ- 
ences in actual reporting behavior are endogenous 
(i.e., determined by real economic and political 
factors that differ among countries). 
Some idea of international differences in finan- 
cial reporting quality can be obtained from Figure 
2, which summarises results in Ball, Kothari and 
Robin (2000) and Ball, Robin and Wu (2000, 
2003). The three panels graph the sensitivity of re- 
ported earnings to contemporary economic gains 
and losses, as measured imperfectly by fiscal-year 
stock returns (details are provided in the source ar- 
ticles). The heights of the bars represent estimates 
of the sensitivity of earnings to contemporary eco- 
nomic gains (black bars) and to contemporary eco- 
nomic losses (white bars) in a particular country or 
group of countries. These sensitivity estimates 
capture the timeliness of gain and loss recognition 
in the countries and country groups - important at- 
tributes of financial reporting quality?” 
Panel A summarises the results for three country 
groups: common-law, code-law and East Asia. 
Panels B and C provide estimates for a selection of 
individual countries. Differences in financial re- 
porting practice among the three groups are readi- 
ly apparent. The most notable difference is the 
considerably higher sensitivity of earnings to con- 
temporary economic losses in the common-law 
category. This evidence of timelier recognition of 
economic losses under common-law accounting is 
consistent with the greater emphasis on sharehold- 
er value in common-law countries. 
The converse is especially relevant to doubts 
about the quality of IFRS implementation that will 
occur, over time, outside of common-law coun- 
tries. Timelier loss recognition is less likely in 
countries where managers are more protected, and 
shareholders have a lesser role in governance, be- 
cause it puts unwelcome pressure on managers to 
fix their loss-making investments and strategies 
Starting with Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000). researchers 
have been concerned that the estimates reported in Figure 2 
could differ in reliability (or bias) across countries and groups, 
because they rely on share price data. While Ball. Kothari and 
Robin (2000: 48) note several reasons to discount this con- 
cern, researchers have developed other tests, which corrobo- 
rate the price-based results. These include tests based on the 
time series of reported earnings (Ball and Robin. 1999; Ball. 
Robin and Wu, 2003) and accruals-based tests (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005: Bushman. Piotroski and Smith. 2006). 
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20 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
Figure 2 
Timeliness of earnings historically has depended on countries’ political and economic institutions 
Panel A 
Common-law, Code-law and East Asia country groups 
Panel B 
Some individual Common-law and Code-law countries 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
Timeliness of earnings historically has depended on countries’ political and economic institutions 
Panel C 
Some individual Asian countries 
Sources: Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000); Ball, Robin and Wu (2000, 2003). I 
more quickly, and to undertake fewer negative- 
NPV investments in the first place. For example, 
timely loss recognition helps to curb managers’ ap- 
petites for ‘pet’ projects and ‘trophy’ acquisitions 
that are socially wasteful and not in the sharehold- 
ers’ interests (Ball, 2001; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). It is not surprising that loss recognition 
timeliness is lower on average in countries where 
individual shareholders are deemed less important 
and managers have more latitude to pursue their 
own preferences. The key implementation ques- 
tion is whether managers in countries whose sys- 
tems are less responsive to the interests of 
shareholders will change their habits under IFRS, 
and exercise their subjective judgment to a greater 
degree in tying their own hands. I have my doubts. 
China’s experience provides a more direct 
source of evidence on the extent of IFRS imple- 
mentation when it is imposed by governments, 
without change occurring in the fundamental eco- 
nomic and political factors affecting financial re- 
porting practice. Ball, Robin and Wu (2000) study 
China’s requirement that all domestic companies 
with foreign shareholders publish financial state- 
ments that conform to IFRS (then known as IAS) 
and that are audited by an international accounting 
firm. Many features of China’s institutional envi- 
ronment militate against high-quality financial re- 
porting, among them being the prevalence of 
‘insider’ networks, the strong political roles of the 
Chinese government and army in the economy, 
and the absence of shareholder litigation rights. 
Ball, Robin, and Wu report that these institutional 
features appear to swamp the effect of mandating 
IAS. When reporting under international account- 
ing standards, the financial statements of Chinese 
firms are no more timely in reflecting economic 
gains or losses than when reporting under local 
standards. This is shown graphically in Panel C of 
Figure 2, where the sensitivities of Chinese earn- 
ings to contemporary economic gains and losses 
(i.e., estimates of gain and loss recognition timeli- 
ness) resemble those of other Asian countries and 
are substantially lower than the common-law 
equivalents. China’s experience with mandating 
IAS shows that it is difficult to achieve a notice- 
able improvement in financial reporting quality in 
prucrice by implanting exogenously developed ac- 
counting standards into a complex institutional en- 
vironment. 
Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) argue that a similar 
outcome is evident in the four East Asian countries 
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22 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
to be on what the rules say, not on how they are 
implemented in practice. 
Implementation is the Achilles heel of IFRS. 
There are overwhelming political and economic 
reasons to expect IFRS enforcement to be uneven 
around the world, including within Europe. 
Substantial international differences in financial 
reporting quality are inevitable, and my major con- 
cerns are that investors will be mislead into be- 
lieving that there is more uniformity in practice 
than actually is the case and that, even to sophisti- 
cated investors, international differences in report- 
ing quality now will be hidden under the rug of 
seemingly uniform standards. 
(Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) 
reported as a group in Panel A of Figure 2, and in- 
dividually in Panel C. Accounting standards in 
these countries historically have been based on 
British standards, on US GAAP and more recently 
on IAS: that is, they have followed a fundamental- 
ly common-law model. If implemented fully, these 
standards should facilitate comparatively high- 
quality financial reporting, and timely loss recog- 
nition in particular. However the outcome, evident 
in the graphs, is different: earnings in the four East 
Asian countries exhibit low sensitivity to both eco- 
nomic gains and losses, in sharp contrast with the 
common-law group. 
An important implication of this area of research 
is that international differences in financial report- 
ing practice occcur as an endogenous function of 
local political and economic institutions, and that 
importing an exogenously-developed set of ac- 
counting standards will not necessarily change 
firms’ actual reporting behavior in a material fash- 
ion. The experiment in China is directly analogous 
to the EU adopting IFRS, and the East Asian ex- 
perience provides a useful precedent also. Like 
China and East Asia, Continental European coun- 
tries have predominantly code-law institutional 
structures and preparer incentives. The experience 
of those countries in importing international stan- 
dards derived from a common law view of finan- 
cial reporting illustrates the difficulty of obtaining 
change in actual financial reporting practice by im- 
porting exogenously developed accounting stan- 
dards into a complex political and economic 
environment .31 
6.4.  Uneven implementation: overview 
Uneven implementation of IFRS seems in- 
evitable. Accrual accounting (and fair value ac- 
counting in particular) involves judgements about 
future cash flows and thereby provides leeway in 
IFRS implementation. Powerful local economic 
and political forces determine how managers, au- 
ditors, courts and regulators respond to that lee- 
way. Uneven implementation curtails the ability of 
uniform standards to reduce information costs and 
information risk. It could increase information 
processing costs, by burying accounting inconsis- 
tencies at a deeper and less transparent level than 
more-readily observable differences in standards. 
It threatens to curtail many of the potential bene- 
fits of IFRS adoption. 
I believe implementation issues deserve far 
greater attention. There is an emerging academic 
literature on the topic.32 Nevertheless, texts on na- 
tional financial accounting and on international ac- 
counting usually contain elaborate expositions on 
accounting standards, but little on the incentives of 
preparers and how these systematically affect ac- 
tual financial reporting practice.33 The focus tends 
7. Some longer term concerns 
This section contains conjectures on some issues 
of longer term concern. One concern is that allow- 
ing unfettered use of the IFRS ‘brand name’ by 
any country discards information about reporting 
quality differences, and does not allow high-quali- 
ty financial reporting regimes to signal that they 
follow better standards than low-quality regimes. 
Another concern is that international standards re- 
duce competition among alternative financial re- 
porting systems, and hence reduce innovation. 
Finally, while the IASB and its promulgated stan- 
dards historically have enjoyed - and currently do 
enjoy - a strong ‘common law’ orientation, over 
time the IASB risks becoming a politicked, po- 
larked, bureaucratic, UN-style body. 
7.1. The IFRS brund name problem 
In the presence of local political and economic 
factors that exert substantial influence on local fi- 
nancial reporting practice, and in the absence of an 
effective worldwide enforcement mechanism, the 
very meaning of IFRS adoption and the implica- 
tions of adoption are far from clear. In the enthusi- 
asm of the current moment, the IFRS ‘brand name’ 
currently is riding high, and IFRS adoption is 
being perceived as a signal of quality. I am not sure 
how long that perception will last. 
)’ Other evidence supports this conclusion. Leuz (2003) re- 
ports that the financial reporting quality of German firms list- 
ed on the New Market does not depend on their choice of US 
GAAP or IFRS (presumably it is determined by preparers’ in- 
centives, not by accounting standards). Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) report substantial differences in reporting quality be- 
tween U.K.  public and private firms, despite them using iden- 
tical accounting standards. Burgstahler. Hail and Leuz (2006) 
and Peek, Cuijpers and Buijink (2006) report similar evidence 
for wider samples of EU public and private firms. 
32 See: El-Gazzar. Finn and Jacob (1999). Street. Gray and 
Bryant (1999). Street and Gray (2001. 2002). Street and 
Bryant (2000), Murphy (2000). Aisbitt (2004) and Larson and 
Street (2004). 
j3 See: Choi. Frost and Meek (1999). Mueller. Gernon and 
Meek (1997), Nobes (1992). Nobes and Parker (1995) and 
Radebaugh and Gray (1997). 
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Figure 3 
An example of a costless (hence useless) signal about quality 
Our Values 
RESPECT: We treat others as we would like to be treated ourselves. We do not tolerate abusive or disrespect- 
ful  treatment. Ruthlessness, callousness, and arrogance don’t belong here. 
INTEGRITY We work with customers and prospects openly, honestly, and sincerely. When we say we will do 
something, we will do it; when we say we cannot or will not do something, then we won’t do it. 
COMMUNICATION: We have an obligation to communicate. Here, we take the time to talk to one another . . . 
and to listen. We believe that information is meant to move and that information moves people. 
EXCELLENCE: We are satisfied with nothing less than the very best in everything we do. We will continue to 
raise the bar for everyone. The great fun here will be for all of us to discover just how good we can really be. 
Source: Enron Corporation, 1998 Annual Report. 
In a famous model, Nobel laureate Michael 
Spence ( 1973) introduced economics to the impor- 
tant problem of credibly signalling one’s quality. 
He argued that when a user wants to know the 
quality levels of other economic agents, but avail- 
able information about quality is imperfect, the 
higher-quality agents want to send signals to dis- 
tinguish themselves from those who are lower- 
quality. But a signal will be credible to its recipient 
only if the costs of signalling are negatively corre- 
lated with actual quality. Unless it is more costly 
for the lower-quality agents to claim they are of 
high quality, they will join the high-quality agents 
in making that claim. If the equilibrium then is that 
every agent makes the same claim, the signal loses 
its informativeness. The only way to make a signal 
informative (i.e., obtain an equilibrium in which 
only the higher-quality agents signal they are of 
high quality) is for the system to incorporate a cost 
of signalling that the lower-quality agents are not 
prepared to pay. 
Applying this reasoning to the hodgepodge of 
100 or so IFRS adopters listed in Figure 1 is dis- 
quieting. If investors want to know the reporting 
quality levels of companies resident in a variety of 
countries, but do not have complete knowledge 
about the countries’ quality levels, then higher- 
quality countries might want to choose IFRS to 
distinguish themselves from those of lower quali- 
ty. But the problem with IFRS adoption, as a sig- 
nal to investors about the financial reporting 
quality of a preparer, is that it is almost costless for 
all countries to signal that they are of high quality: 
i.e., to adopt the highest available accounting stan- 
dards on paper. Worse, IFRS adoption most likely 
costs less to the lower-quality countries, for two 
reasons. First, the lower-quality regimes will incur 
fewer economic and political costs of actually en- 
forcing the adopted standards. It is the higher- 
quality reporting regimes that are more likely to 
incur the cost of actually enforcing IFRS, because 
they have the institutions (such as a higher-quality 
audit profession, more effective courts system, 
better shareholder litigation rules) that are more 
likely to require enforcement of whatever stan- 
dards are adopted. Second, by wholesale adoption 
of IFRS, the lower-quality regimes can avoid the 
costs of running their own standard-setting body, 
which likely are proportionally higher than in larg- 
er econ~mies.’~ 
The signalling equilibrium thus is likely to be 
that both the lower-quality and the higher-quality 
countries find it in their interest to adopt IFRS, so 
the adoption decision becomes uninformative 
about quality. Judging by the list of approximately 
100 IFRS adopters, this is what has transpired. A 
classic ‘free rider’ problem emerges: it is essen- 
tially costless for low-quality countries to use the 
IFRS ‘brand name,’ so they all do. If IFRS adop- 
tion is a free good, what companies or countries 
will not take it? When it is costless to say other- 
wise, who is going to say: ‘We will not adopt high 
standards’? 
Figure 3 provides an example of a costless (and 
hence useless) signal about quality: Enron 
Corporation’s stated code of ethics, denoted ‘Our 
Values’. This set of high ethical standards was re- 
ported to the public in Enron’s 1998 Annual 
Report, released early in 1999, at the height of the 
company’s malfeasance in financial and energy 
markets. Relatively speaking, it costs little to adopt 
such standards and promote their adoption to the 
public. Enforcing the standards is another matter: 
in Enron’s case, that would have involved not only 
the cost of inspection and audit of managerial be- 
haviour, but also the cost to managers of forgoing 
opportunities to manipulate energy and capital 
markets. 
34 This has been claimed to be an advantage of IFRS. No 
doubt it is an advantage to the lower-quality adopters, but it is 
difficult to see i t  as a long term advantage to international fi- 
nancial reporting in general. 
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The only way to make the IFRS signal informa- 
tive about quality is for the worldwide financial re- 
porting system to incorporate a cost of signalling 
that the lower-quality agents are not prepared to 
pay. This would necessitate an effective worldwide 
enforcement mechanism, under which countries 
that adopt but do not effectively implement IFRS 
are either penalised or prohibited from using the 
IFRS brand name. In the absence of an effective 
worldwide enforcement mechanism (which I be- 
lieve would be a bad idea for different reasons, dis- 
cussed below), i t  is essentially costless for 
low-quality countries to use the IFRS ‘brand 
name’, and local political and economic factors in- 
evitably will exert substantial influence on local fi- 
nancial reporting practice, IFRS adoption 
notwithstanding. 
If allowing all countries to use the IFRS label 
discards the information in accounting standards 
about reporting quality differences, then the avail- 
able quality signal could become the quality of the 
enforcement of standards, not standards per se. 
The major reason to expect enforcement - not 
mere adoption of standards - to be a credible sig- 
nal is that it is more costly for low-quality coun- 
tries to adopt high enforcement standards, because 
this would run counter to local political and eco- 
nomic interests. The Spence signalling model pre- 
dicts a separation between low-quality and 
high-quality actors. One possibility thus is that 
high-quality financial reporting regimes will join a 
group whose member countries subject the en- 
forcement standards of their companies to group 
inspection. This is one interpretation of the ‘con- 
vergence’ process being followed by the US, the 
outcome of which seems likely to be adopting es- 
sentially the same standards as IFRS, but without 
using the IFRS ‘brand name’. The irony of these 
types of possible outcome is that IFRS might sim- 
ply shift the dimension on which international dif- 
ferences and coalitions occur from accounting 
standards (as previously) to enforcement standards. 
7.2. Competition and innovation among systems 
Competition breeds innovation, encourages 
adaptation, dispels complacency and penalises bu- 
reaucracy. International competition among eco- 
nomic systems in general is healthy. Imposing 
worldwide standards therefore is a risky centrali- 
sation process in any sphere of economic activity. 
I am aware of no compelling reason why interna- 
tional competition among financial reporting sys- 
tems is no less desirable than in other spheres, and 
should not be encouraged.”s 
I am particularly concerned about the long run 
implications of countries downgrading the re- 
sources and status of - and even eliminating - their 
national standard-setting bodies. I therefore am a 
keener advocate of ‘convergence’ than of outright 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
IFRS adoption (yet another reason to suspect, or at 
least hope, that national differences will prevail 
over international uniformity). 
7.3. Long-term politics, polarisation and 
bureaucracy 
The final longer-term concern is the risk of the 
IASB (or its successor) becoming a representative, 
politicised, polarised, bureaucratic, UN-style body. 
The IASB and its promulgated standards histori- 
cally have - and currently do - enjoy a strong 
‘common law’ orientation. How long that will last 
is another matter. 
The IASC was founded in 1973 by professional 
accountancy bodies in Australia, Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. Since 
then, there has been a drift towards international 
representation. Currently, the International 
Accounting Standards Committee Foundation has 
six trustees from the AsidOceania region, six from 
Europe, six from North America and four from any 
region of the world. In spite of this drift, IFRS cur- 
rently reflect a strong common-law philosophy. 
The current membership representation and phi- 
losophy of the IASB seem likely to face challenges 
in the longer term. Over time, each of the 100 or so 
IFRS-adopting nations will have a politically-le- 
gitimate argument that they deserve some sort of 
representation in the standard-setting process. Do 
not the standards that are chosen by the IASB af- 
fect their countries, too? 
8. Faith, hope and parity 
Uniform reporting rules worldwide - parity for all 
- seems a great virtue. And there is no doubting 
that at least some convergence of standards seems 
desirable - and inevitable - in an increasingly 
globalised world. The adoption of IFRS by almost 
100 countries, and the convergence processes cur- 
rently underway, are testimony to increased glob- 
alisation - as well as to the quality and influence 
of IFRS. 
Nevertheless, a note of caution is required, for 
reasons that include: 
1. Internationally uniform accounting rules are a 
leap of faith, untested by experience or by a 
significant body of academic results. 
2. The emphasis in IFRS on fair value accounting 
is a concern, particularly in relation to report- 
ing in lesser-developed nations. 
3. The incentives of preparers (managers) and en- 
forcers (auditors, courts, regulators, politi- 
’’ Arguments for international competition among account- 
ing standards are made by Dye (1985). Ball (1995). Dye and 
Verrecchia (1995) and Dye and Sunder (2001). 
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Leuz, C. and Pfaff, D. (eds.). The Economics and Politics 
Oxford University Press. 
Ball, Ray and Brown, Philip R. (1968). ‘An empirical eval- 
uation of accounting income numbers’. Journal of 
cians) remain primarily local, and inevitably 
that will tend to be ‘swept under the 
will create differences in financial reporting O f  Accounting: International Perspectives. Oxford: 
rug’ of uniformity. 
4. 
5 .  
6. 
It is essentially costless to say one has the high- 
est standards, so even the lowest-qua~ity re- 
the IFRS ‘brand name’. 
Research,16:159-178. 
Ball, Ray, Kothari, S.  P. and Ashok, Robin,A. (2000). ‘The 
effect of international institutional factors on properties 
Economics, 29: 1-5 1. 
porting regimes be attracted to free Of of accounting earnings’, Journal of Accounting and 
Ball, Ray and Ashok, Robin (1999). ‘Time-series proper- 
Unpublished working paper, University of Rochester and 
Uniform international standards reduce compe- ties of accounting earnings: international tition among systems. 
Rochester Institute of Technology. 
Ball, Ray, Ashok, Robin and Sadka, Gil(2006). ‘Are time- 
liness and conservatism due to debt or equity markets? An 
international test of “contracting” and “value relevance” 
theories of accounting’. Manuscript, University of 
The long run Of 
be that the IASB (Or its long run 
successor) becomes a representative, politi- 
cised, polarised, bureaucratic, UN-style body. 
Few would disagree that some degree of unifor- 
mity in accounting rules at every level - firm, in- 
dustry, country, or globe - is optimal. Exactly how 
much is a long-unresolved issue. And few would 
dispute that widening globalisation of markets and 
politics implies some narrowing of rule differences 
among nations, though here too the optimal degree 
of uniformity is far from clear. IFRS adoption is an 
economic and political experiment - a leap of faith 
- and only time will tell what the pros and cons of 
IFRS to investors turn out to be. 
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